Realism in Indochina

This is an excerpt of a paper I wrote on Realism and the French Colonization of Indochina for my Contemporary International Politics class.


The realist interpretation of imperialism is that the urge to dominate is intrinsic in human nature and politics. Powerful nations tend to be imperialistic by their nature, and the system of international anarchy permits them to do so. This human drive means that the struggle for power is the essence of politics. This was in observed France’s use of power in West Africa and is seen here again in Indochina. In both cases France used its military might, using soldiers to expand eastward from West Africa, just as they presented the Siamese with two options at the Mekong Banks, surrender Laos or be destroyed. England’s holding in India and Burma were largely unthreatened through the 1880s, with Siam separating them from French holdings in Vietnam. Siam was naturally drawn into this bi-polar conflict for the sole reason that it stood between France and England; if France didn’t move in first, England would.



France was able to pursue these policies in both Africa and Southeast Asia because of a general system of international anarchy. Just as nobody defended the enslaved Africans under French control, there was no one to protect Indochina from French Expansion. The French quickly broke their agreement with Ho Chi Minh, provoking a war and suffering no direct consequences.


However, unlike the African empire, Indochina did prove quite as economically productive. Between 1924 and 1930, 2,870 million Francs were invested in Indochina, compared with 492 million between 1888 and 1918. Investment from the French and new large corporations such as the Bank of Indochina helped build canals and drain deltas to increase agricultural productivity. Rice exports increased by over 500% in the sixty-year period of French occupation. French investments infrastructure and communications helped make Indochina an important center of trade for the Empire and in East Asia.
This does not, however, mean that Indochina was not used out of self-interested for the state. While Africa was used for political reasons, it was unrealistic for it to be as economically efficient as Indochina, which had an abundance of fertile soil and natural sea-ports. As Britain gained power economically through their victory in the Opium War with China, France needed to establish an Asian empire in order to inhibit Britain’s relative gain.

Another key point in which African colonization and Indochinese colonization differ is in the applied exit strategy. After World War II, France began to give power concessions to West Africa, while in the Pacific, they fought for control, eventually leading to the French Indochina War. In both situations, although pursuing two opposite colonial policies, France was acting in its own intent for power. If France wanted to retain any international power after World War II, it first needed a great deal of economic recovery. Attempts to integrate Africans in French society had already been made, and now when they could serve as cheap labor, this policy was pursued more aggressively. Geopolitically, this was nearly impossible in Southeast Asia. Instead, France needed to keep the economic miracle of their Indochinese empire afloat for as long as possible. In both instances, France acted out of self-interest to help facilitate an economic recovery and their own preservation.

The fact that the realist approach to these two events is well justified, despite their differences, proves its timeless flexibility. Like the reality of a situation’s place and time, the realistic analysis of rational action changes. Where one course of action was rational in Africa, such as the abandonment of its territories, it was irrational in Vietnam, even though a provisional government was in place and it would lead to inevitable war. Unlike idealism, it does not grasp to a single concept on the hope of it being true, despite realities. However, in the traits that French African colonization and Indochinese colonization share, it can be attributed to the few eternal tenets of realism, that human nature is flawed and governs the actions of men, and that states strive for interest defined in terms of power. The French competed with the English on two different continents for colonial power; where one showed progress, the other needed to compensate. Despite being across the planet, a British gain in Southeast Asia, according to the realist principle of relative gain, was as much a loss of power for France. The liberal explanation is too morally rooted to provide a rational justification of France’s actions, and doesn’t explain such aggressive and self-interested policies. Only the harsh world of realism, with man’s will to dominate, commitment to self-interest and power, and absence of moral code in the world of international anarchy, can imperialism be fully explained and understood.